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HAGIWARA SAKUTARÔ, BUDDHIST REALISM, AND 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JAPANESE MODERN 
POETRY
Roberto Pinheiro Machado1
Resumo: Este artigo aborda a obra do poeta Hagiwara Sakutarô (1886-1942) a partir de uma 
perspectiva comparativa que engaja filosofia e literatura. A dimensão filosófica da poesia 
de Sakutarô é analisada por meio de uma leitura intertextual entre a obra do poeta japonês 
e a epistemologia budista presente nos textos em sânscrito dos filósofos Dignāga and 
Dharmakīrti (século V). Essa análise comparativa é efetuada sob a perspectiva da influência 
do naturalismo europeu no surgimento da poesia japonesa moderna. Demonstrando a 
possibilidade de um realismo budista que compartilha importantes características estéticas 
com o naturalismo, o artigo enfatiza a dimensão budista da poesia de Sakutarô, a qual se 
desvela apesar da rejeição ao budismo operada pelo próprio poeta como passo necessário 
para o estabelecimento da modernidade nas letras japonesas. 
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Abstract: This article approaches the works of poet Hagiwara Sakutarô (1886-1942) 
from a comparative perspective that engages philosophy and literature. The philosophical 
dimension of Sakutarô’s poetry is analyzed by means of inter-textual readings that draw 
on the tradition of Buddhist epistemology and on the texts of logicians Dignāga and 
Dharmakīrti (5th century). The comparative analysis is considered under the perspective 
of the influence of Naturalism and the use of description in the emergence of Japanese 
modern poetry. Pointing to the possibility of a Buddhist realism that shares some common 
characteristics with Naturalism, the article emphasizes the Buddhist dimension of 
Sakutarô’s poetry, which appears in spite of the poet’s turn to Western philosophy (notably 
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to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Kant), as well as to his overt rejection of Buddhism as a 
necessary step to the modernization of the Japanese letters.
Keywords: Hagiwara Sakutarô, Japanese Poetry, Buddhism, Modernity, Philosophy
Introdution
The relation between Buddhism and Japanese poetry has been given scant 
scholarly attention in the context of Japanese studies. In Emptiness and Temporality: 
Buddhism and Medieval Japanese Poetics (2008), Esperanza Ramirez-Christensen 
presents the problem in the following way: 
The presence of Buddhist ways of understanding in the very structures and aesthetics 
of classical Japanese poetry has not, I feel, been adequately appreciated or rigorously 
examined in Western scholarship, and the situation, oddly enough, is little better in 
Japanese scholarship. The reason, in the former case, is surely the former dominance in 
Anglo-American literary studies of the New Criticism, with its proscription, particularly 
in poetic analysis, of what were considered extraliterary factors, such as biography and 
philosophy. The Japanese case is more difficult to explain, but it is probably related to the 
anti-intellectual, intuitionalist orientation of Japanese literary critical writing (as distinct 
from the philological rigor of Japanese textual studies); in general, modern native scholars 
of classical poetry take the ubiquity of Buddhist themes and attitudes in premodern literature 
for granted; an obligatory nod to the idea of impermanence and the practice of medieval 
reclusion is deemed sufficient to confirm it. (RAMIREZ-CHRISTENSEN 2008: xii)
The aim of this essay is to offer a contribution to answering the demand posited 
by Ramirez-Christensen. My focus, however, will be modern poetry, instead of the 
classical one. If the lack of critical attention to the relation between Buddhism and 
poetry is patent in regard to the classical production, this is even more the case with 
modern works, where the influence of Western philosophy tends to occupy the larger 
portion of the scholarly consideration.
The focus here will be the Buddhist philosophical dimension present in the works 
of Hagiwara Sakutarô (1886-1942), a poet who is generally considered the founder 
of Japanese modern poetry. The analysis that follows is motivated by the fact that 
Sakutarô himself openly rejected Buddhism as something that, in his view, hindered the 
modernization of Japanese letters. What will be argued here, then, is the existence of a 
subliminal mindset informed by Buddhist epistemology underlying some of the poet’s 
most important works. My analytical conclusions will be suggested much in contrary to 
the author’s own publicized intentions and dispositions. 
In order to unfold my analysis, I will start by introducing the theme of the emergence 
of Japanese modern literature, drawing on the work of Japanese critic Karatani Kôjin 
to present a historicized version of how the idea of modernity came to be understood in 
Japanese scholarship. With the establishment of modernity in perspective, I will proceed 
to consider the theme of the Western influence in the emergence of Japanese modern 
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poetry, paying special attention to the role of Naturalism in the process. I will argue that 
in the Japanese adoption of naturalist literary aesthetics the philosophical dimension 
of the movement, notably its strong reliance on Comtean Positivism, was obliterated 
by the traditional philosophical mindset that prevailed in Japan. I will then proceed 
to investigate the core of such philosophical mindset, calling attention to similarities 
between Naturalism and Buddhist epistemology in terms of their direct grasp of reality 
and their avowal of the role of description in establishing truth. My next step will be to 
turn to Sakutarô’s poetry. Sakutarô’s early textual adoption of a Buddhist epistemological 
stance will be observed in the poem Jimen no soko no byônin no kao (1917) where the 
poet’s text will be read comparatively with that of Buddhist epistemology. Such inter-
textual reading will uncover the idea of truth present in Sakutarô’s text in a way that 
will suggest its similarity and compatibility with Buddhist logic. The analysis will then 
proceed to a setting of the poem in relation to the Twelve-linked Chain of Co-dependent 
Origination (Sk. dvādaśāṅga-pratītyasamutpāda, Jp. jûni’in’en 十二因縁), showing 
that Sakutarô’s poem could be read as a metaphor to the Buddhist notion of saṃsāra 
(Jp. rin’ne 輪廻). 
My final step in the analysis of Sakutarô’s philosophical disposition will be to 
highlight the poet’s complex relation to Buddhist thought and to Western philosophy, 
notably in the poet’s engagement with the works of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Kant. 
In this final step I will suggest that Sakutarô’s rejection of Buddhism and concomitant 
turn towards Western philosophy betrays an internal search for answers that could have 
be found within the very Buddhist textual tradition. I will conclude by suggesting a 
similar disposition towards Buddhism and the theme of transcendence in Sakutarô and 
Karatani. 
1. The Role of Description in Japanese Modern Literature
One the most influential critical works to examine the fundaments of Japanese 
literary modernity is Karatani Kôjin’s Origins of Modern Japanese Literature (Nihon 
Kindai Bungaku no Kigen, 1988). Karatani’s analysis provides us with an excellent 
starting point to answer the question the philosophical underpinnings of modern 
Japanese literature and of Hagiwara Sakutarô’s poetry. Karatani perceives the birth of 
Japanese modernity as intertwined with the appearance of Realism, which in its turn is 
embedded in what he calls “the discovery of landscape.” For Karatani, a crucial moment 
in the history of the Japanese arts occurs in the third decade of the Meiji period (1868-
1912), when an epistemological turn produces a new way of perceiving the environment 
and of rendering it in art. The critic defines landscape as follows:
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Landscape is an epistemological constellation, the origins of which were suppressed as 
soon as it was produced. It is a constellation which appeared in nascent form in a literary 
trend of realism in the 1890’s. (KARATANI 1988: 22) 
Landscape is later described by Karatani as the result of an inversion of consciousness, 
one that brought to the foreground that which normally pertained to the background. The 
same process is said to have occurred in the West with the transition from landscape 
painting to medieval painting (28). The inversion implies a transformation of one’s mode of 
perception, resulting in a new semiotic configuration (27). In the case of Japanese art such 
inversion, or the discovery of landscape, promotes a flight from the transcendental vision 
of the world to the objectively perceived reality filtrated by the new presence of the subject:
Once a landscape has been established, its origins are repressed from memory. It takes in 
the appearance of an “object” which has been there, outside us, from the start. An “object,” 
however, can only be constituted within a landscape. The same may be said of the “subject,” 
or self. The philosophical standpoint which distinguishes between subject and object came into 
existence within what I refer to as “landscape.” Rather than existing prior to landscape, subject 
and object emerge from it. (34) 
Landscape is thus as sort of ground to the emergence of the modern subject, or more 
precisely, the locus for the epistemological fissure that divides reality between the modern 
self and its other. This emergence of the self is the real epistemological turn that, according 
to Karatani’s analysis, sets modern Japanese literature in motion. Before that, something 
such as “landscape,” together with the descriptive technique that renders it, simply did not 
exist:
In sansuiga the painter is not looking at an object but envisioning the transcendental. Similarly, 
poets like Bashō and Sanetomo were not looking at “landscapes.” As Yanagita Kunio has said, 
there is not a single line of description in Bashō’s Oku no hosomichi (Narrow road to the deep 
north, 1694). Even what looks like description is not. (21)
Karatani establishes a relation of virtual identity between landscape, realism, 
description, and modernity. His assertion that “realism in modern literature established 
itself within the context of landscapes” (29), suggests the compartmentalization of a larger 
process. According to the critic, in Japan, just as in the West, the birth of description (or the 
adoption of realism, or still the discovery of landscape) did away with the transcendental 
vision of reality that dominated the arts in a premodern, dark, and subjectless age. The 
Western establishment of modernity was thus just repeated in Japan at a later point in time, 
namely somewhere in the third decade of the Meiji era.   
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I would argue that Karatani’s transposition of the Western concept of modernity 
to Japan fails to recognize important dissimilarities and incommensurabilities. What 
is implied in the overcoming of the transcendental suggested by Karatani is obviously 
the downplay of a religious worldview that prevailed in pre-modern times in favor of a 
new humanistic stance centered in the individual self and informing the new modernity, 
of which literary realism is an expression. While such overcoming is generally agreed 
to have occurred in Western history, the same can hardly be said to have happened 
also in Japan. The absence of a transcendental religious worldview similar to the one 
upheld by Christianity in the West reveals Karatani’s claim regarding the overcoming 
of transcendence and the concomitant birth of description in Japan during Meiji as the 
product of a long stretch. What transcendence was overcome in Japan becomes the 
question immediately begged. If we concede to Buddhism the role of informing an 
important part of the Japanese pre-Meiji worldview, then we must qualify our assertions 
regarding the existence of a transcendental realm that could be overcome towards a 
Western model of modernity in Japan. Although transcendental realms have been 
posited by some schools of Japanese Buddhism, especially by sects such as Pure Land 
and Nichiren, to avow the presence of an overarching transcendental Buddhist idea 
informing Japanese arts and literature all over the pre-Meiji era would be, again, the 
product of a long stretch. Such claim would imply the deflation of the role in Japanese 
culture of those Buddhist schools that, contrarily to Pure Land and Nichiren, posited 
immediate experience and direct perception as the main underlying principle of aesthetic 
production, and not the search for any sort of after-life paradise. Much less the Shintô 
dimension of Japanese religion could be construed as positing a transcendental realm 
prone to be overcome during Meiji by Realism, description or landscape. 
In spite of the diverse readings of Buddhist doctrine produced by the different 
Buddhist sects established in Japan throughout its history, together with their 
accompanying greater or lesser capacity to create transcendental realms for their 
partisans (usually in accordance with their greater or lesser tendency to offer popularized 
versions of philosophical/doctrinal material), it is fairly accurate to say that what took 
root in the arts and in the general intellectual make up of the Japanese was primarily the 
Mahāyāna tradition in its Chan/Zen format imported by Eisai (1141–1215) and Dōgen 
(1200–1253) from China in the late Heian and early Kamakura periods. 
Undoubtedly the role of Bodhidharma’s tradition in the establishment of the 
Japanese classical arts needs not be disputed; one only has to think of the Rinzai 
monks, Sen no Rikyū (1522–1591), Sesshū (1420–1506), and so on.2 Deep rooted 
in the Mahāyāna worldview, Japanese classical arts favored presence and immediate 
2. Sen no Rikyū (千利休, 522–1591) had a profound influence in the art of the tea ceremony, establishing 
the style of wabi-cha, that valued simplicity, directness, and honesty in performance. Sesshū (雪舟, 
1420–1506) was the most prominent master of ink and wash painting during the Muromachi period 
(1336–1573). Both were closely related to the Rinzai (臨済) Zen tradition brought to Japan from China 
in the early Kamakura period (1185–1333) by monk Myōan Eisai (明菴栄西, 1141–1215).
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experience over transcendence and eschatology. Japanese aesthetic and philosophical 
concepts, such as mono no aware and mujô, translate Buddhist notions found in Sanskrit 
sūtra and abhidharma texts (in this case dukkha and anītya, respectively). In sum, while 
Mahāyāna philosophy, with its ideal of the boddhisattva, poses the perfecting of reality 
(prajñaparāmitā), and as such the attainment of nirvana, in the realm of everyday 
experienced phenomena, the transcendental that Karatani sees in sansuiga must be 
understood as something at least very different from the sort of god-centered religious 
realm that was overcome together with the Western discovery of landscape during the 
transition from the European middle ages to modernity. It thus becomes clear that Japan 
could not have made that same movement sometime in the third decade of Meiji. 
In spite of this problematic linkage between the discovery of landscape, or the 
adoption of realism, and a pre-modern transcendental realm that is surpassed towards 
modernity, Karatani’s analysis brings us closer to the important question of how can 
a direct experience of reality come into being through the modern literary text. Using 
Karatani’s own words, “realism in modern literature established itself within the context 
of landscapes” (29), and remembering that such realism is rendered through description, 
the answer to such question must be precisely the latter, that is, description. 
Description is that which makes a direct experience of reality come into being 
through the modern literary text. And description is also that which characterizes 
the aesthetic mode of Japanese literary modernity started during Meiji. Description, 
however, is not a product of the overcoming of transcendence. Nor is it in any way 
contrary to the traditional Buddhist disposition found in the Japanese arts and literature. 
Bellow we will look into what Hagiwara Sakutarô has to say about the meaning 
of poetry and observe how that meaning connects to a notion of truth compatible to the 
one advanced by Buddhist logic. Before we do that, however, we must review certain 
aspects of the establishment of Japanese modern poetry, calling special attention to the 
roles of naturalism and description in its development.
2. Naturalism and Buddhism in a Syncretic Mode: Description and 
Truth in Japanese Modern Poetics 
The relation between philosophy and literature has been analyzed in considerable 
detail by Martha Nussbaum in Love’s Knowledge (1990), where the author notes that 
“literary form is not separable from philosophical content, but is, itself, a part of content—
an integral part, then, of the search for and the statement of truth (NUSSBAUM 1990: 
iii). Nussbaum’s perception of literary form as inextricably connected to philosophical 
truth immediately sets literature in the realm of philosophy; for philosophy must be 
the sort of inquiry that has truth itself as its primary object. The author’s remarks also 
suggest the possibility of inter-textual reading between literature and philosophy carried 
out with the search for or the expression of truth as a common and guiding principle. 
77Estudos Japoneses, n. 35, p. 71-103, 2015
Truth itself can be seen as an inter-textual connector between literary and philosophical 
texts in the context of a comparative approach where philosophy and literature shed 
light at each other.    
 We should thus turn to the specifics of poetry and look for a hint to any tangible 
relation it may have to truth. In her search for the Buddhist dimension of Japanese 
classical poetry, Ramirez-Christensen discerns the existence of a traditional usage 
of poetry “understood as the symbolic demonstration of a religious or philosophical 
system.” Here the author proceeds to a definition of what she calls “the poetic process 
of Zen meditation,” where
Poetry is viewed first and foremost as the transformative power of the liberated mind 
(kokoro 心) to breach the predetermined meanings of the linguistic system, which is the 
same as to show the ultimate emptiness of the sign, and how it is precisely emptiness 
that enables the play of language, the infinite possibilities of metaphorization. (RAMIREZ-
CHRISTENSEN 2008: 32)
In Ramirez-Christensen’s model of Zen poetics, the liberated mind breaches the 
predetermined meanings of the linguistic system just to go back to a play of language 
now purified, or enriched, by the infinite possibilities of metaphorization. Metaphor 
seems to continue after the mind becomes liberated and language appears to remain as 
the focus of the poetic process. In my view this model turns the entire poetic endeavor 
into a circular event: the liberated (poetic) mind attempts to break through language just 
to go back into metaphorical play: language becomes the beginning and the end, and 
metaphor appears as an end in itself. 
Contrarily to Ramirez-Christensen’s view, I argue that the gist of Zen poetics lies 
not in free metaphorization, but in breaking with predetermined linguistic meanings 
with the intent of arriving at a consolidated expression of truth that is at the same time 
the product of a direct experience of reality as well as poetic form achieved through 
linguistic description. While Ramirez-Christensen seems to understand the poetic 
process of Zen meditation in terms of Zen kôans or similar linguistic products based on 
free metaphorizations, I consider the same poetic process in terms of the haiku of poets 
such as Bashô and Buson. I believe that the direct experience of reality established in 
the haiku format configures the quintessential poetic expression of truth achieved by 
means of literary description and Zen meditation.      
Many philosophies have supported the role of description as a means of 
access to reality as such, or to the establishment of truth in linguistic terms. Even 
mutually disparaging philosophies such as Phenomenology and Positivism have 
argued for description’s power in rendering real experience. While the Husserlian 
phenomenological-descriptive method is thought to have influence the birth of literary 
instances such as the French nouveau roman, Positivism, with its emphasis on direct 
observation and empiricism, can be said to have provided an epistemological ground 
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to the development of Naturalism. With this in mind, it is clear that description as such 
does not pertain exclusively to any philosophical school. 
Buddhist philosophy in particular, with its epistemology based on direct 
perception and immediate experience, is also compatible with the descriptive mode 
in literature. Turning to the history of Japanese poetry, we can suggest how the 
descriptive mode of Western modernity was reinterpreted in Japan and subsumed 
under a Buddhist epistemology. 
Modern descriptive literary technique made its way into Japanese poetry by 
means of two major events that occurred at the end of the nineteenth century: the 
development of the genbun-itchi movement, and the establishment of shintaishi, or 
new style poetry. The first proposed the unification of written and spoken language, 
and the second started a revolution of poetic aesthetics through the influence of 
translated Western verse. 
The role of genbun-itchi in the creation of Japanese modern poetry was first 
observed in 1906 by the influential critic Shimamura Hôgetsu (1871-1918). In an 
article published in the June issue of the magazine Bunshō Sekai (The Literary World), 
entitled “Isseki bunwa” (One Night’s Conversation), Hôgetsu proceeded to a defense 
of the genbun-itchi’s proposal for the creation of a colloquial literary style in Japan, 
and predicted its future adoption in modern Japanese poetry (TOMASI 2007: 122).3 
The genbun-itchi is closely connected to the rise of Naturalism in Japan, another 
movement fully endorsed by Hôgetsu. As Massimiliano Tomasi remarks,
Following the appearance of Shimazaki Tōson’s novel Hakai 破壊 (The Broken 
Commandment) in 1906, Hōgetsu declared his full support for this literary school, writing 
a number of consequential articles that gave momentum to the rise of the movement. This 
surge of a strong naturalist trend touched all areas of literature. Naturalism’s denunciation 
of traditional literary conventions and its call for a plain and direct mode of expression 
found fertile ground in the realm of poetry where such a call soon came to signify the 
rejection of a fixed meter and the employment of poetic expressions that were the result 
of the poet’s own creation rather then a recycling from the conventional poetic canon. Its 
call for objectivity and for a direct connection to reality and one’s environment also had 
a vital influence on poets and their poetic production. (125)
What interests us here is to note that Naturalism’s call for a direct connection 
with reality, which was aptly noted by Tomasi, makes it primarily compatible 
with Buddhist epistemology and its emphasis on direct perception (of which more 
bellow). We should remark, furthermore, that from a philosophical standpoint 
Japanese Naturalism differs substantially from its European counterpart. Although 
in both movements the call for objectivity is a mutually shared principle, European 
3. This appears in the section of Hôgetsu’s article entitled “Genbun itchi to shōrai no shi” (Genbun-itchi 
and the poetry of the future).
79Estudos Japoneses, n. 35, p. 71-103, 2015
Naturalism’s objectivity carries a heavy connotation of Comtean Positivism, which 
is virtually absent from the Japanese movement. Let us then look more closely to the 
positivistic dimension of European Naturalism. 
The theme of Naturalism as a world literary phenomenon has been examined by 
Christopher Hill, who observes the distinct patterns of circulation by means of which 
the movement emerged in Latin America and in Asia. The Brazilian and Argentine 
movements appeared through contact with French currents, but also by means of the 
works of Spanish writers, such as Benito Pérez Galdós and Emilia Pardo Bazán, in the 
case of Argentina, and Portuguese ones, such as José Maria de Eça de Queirós, in the 
case of Brazil. As Hill notes, that itself accounts for a significant difference between 
the European and the Latin American movements (HILL 2009: 1199). 
In the case of East Asia, the path of circulation would involve both a direct 
implication with France as well as a detour through English. The fact that Shimazaki 
Tôson (1872–1943), the central figure in the origin of Japanese Naturalism, was fluent 
in English and learned French only later in his life suggests the role of the English 
language, and of translation, in the transmission of Naturalism to Japan.4 The arrival 
of the movement in East Asia thus started with Japan; Naturalism was subsequently 
transmitted from Japan to China and to Korea (1205).
Such distinct patterns of circulation suggest the possibility of distinct 
philosophical contexts in which the movement was received starting in the second 
half of nineteenth century. It is generally agreed that the Positivism of Auguste Comte 
(1798–1857) constitutes the major philosophical component of literary Naturalism. 
Regarded as the founder of the discipline of sociology, Comte’s influence on 
nineteenth century France was far ranging, and it is not inaccurate to say that Émile 
Zola (1840–1902) became his major literary voice. Naturalism’s attempt to apply 
scientific principles of objectivity to the study of human behavior repeats Positivism’s 
defense of empiricism and rationality as the correct way to approach reality. 
As we have seen from Tomasi’s abovementioned fragment, Naturalism played 
a major role in the rejection of fixed meter that came to signify the transition from the 
classical poetic form in Japan to the free-style colloquial verse that, we should remark, 
was established by Hagiwara Sakutarô in his 1917 Howling to the Moon. With this 
in mind, it becomes evident that Naturalism must have exerted a major influence on 
Sakutarô, just as, by symmetry, must have Positivism. However, this logic seems to 
have been broken at some point. In order to perceive where Positivism failed to make 
its way into Sakutarô’s poetry, we must look into the reception of Positivism in Japan 
in more general terms.
4. Tôson’s relation to the English language is an important aspect of his professional and intellectual 
development, as well of the establishment of Naturalism in Japan. The author started his professional 
career as a professor of English at Meiji Women’s School in 1882. For a discussion of Tôson’s relation 
to the French language please refer to William E. Naff’s The Kiso Road: The Life and Times of 
Shimazaki Tōson (University of Hawaii Press, 2011), pp. 351-359.
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It is in the domain of the novel that the complex question of the adoption of 
Naturalism/Positivism in the Japanese letters becomes more evident. Although a close 
comparative reading of the Japanese and the European Naturalist movements is beyond 
the scope of this article, a brief look at Shimazaki Tôson’s Hakai (1906) and Émile 
Zola’s Germinal (1885), two novels that are generally regarded as the masterpieces of 
the genre in Japan and in Europe, will show us remarkable differences in philosophical 
content that are highly pertinent to our inquiry. Perhaps the most important difference 
involves the question of determinism, which is one of the major tenets of Comte’s 
philosophy. Although some level of social determinism is undeniably present in Hakai, 
especially in the portrayal of the condition of the shinheimin,5 Tôson’s protagonist’s 
flight to America at the end of the book stands for the very possibility of overcoming 
such determinism. Although it could be argued that Zola’s Germinal ends in a similar 
optimistic note, this time with a heavy socialist utopian connotation, it is clear that in 
Zola’s novel, Étienne Lantier’s capacity to transcend his social determinisms does not 
shoulder that of Tôson’s Ushimatsu.   
If in Hakai’s social determinism is subdued in comparison to Germinal, its portrayal 
of genetic determinism is virtually non-existent: although Tôson engages in some fairly 
cruel descriptions of the shinheimin as doomed to a lowly existence, Ushimatsu is never 
a heir to the shinheimin’s shorcomings. Nothing in his physique or intellectual make up 
betrays any kind of lowly origin. In Germinal, on the contrary, Zola’s genetic theories 
come into play with full force as Étienne Lantier is described as having inherited his 
ancestors’ traits, which include, for instance, a drinking habit usually followed by fits of 
rage. 
My point with this all too brief analysis is that such differences in content are 
not only fundamental to the perception of the philosophical dimension of Japanese 
Naturalism, but above all to the understanding of the originality of the Japanese 
movement. Such originality can be more fully appreciated through a comparison 
between the Naturalist novel in Japan and in Latin America, another area involved in the 
circulation of Naturalism and its philosophical principles. Here again limitations of space 
constrain us to a few brief remarks, which, however, should help us clarify the question 
of the relation between philosophical Positivism and Naturalism in Japan. Through the 
following we should notice the much stronger presence of Positivist ideology in Latin 
America as an indicator of the Japanese selective adoption of the genre at the level of 
philosophical content. 
Still in regard to the theme of determinism, the novels of Mexican Federico 
Gamboa (1864–1939) and Brazilian Aluísio Azevedo (1857–1913), while setting the 
ground for the rise of Naturalism in their countries, presented characters that repeated 
faithfully Zola’s positivist philosophy of existential atavism. Such is the case of Aluísio 
5. The word shinheimin (新平民) translates as “new commoner,” and refers to the new social status 
assumed by former outcastes as the caste system was abolished in Japan in the early Meiji period. 
Tôson’s Hakai approaches this theme from the perspective of literary Naturalism. 
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Azevedo’s O mulato (1881), where the mixed race protagonist Raimundo returns to 
his hometown unaware of his origin as the son of a black slave woman just to find his 
demise without ever being capable of transcending his racial condition. The same sort of 
deterministic fate runs throughout Federico Gamboa’s Santa (1903), where the condition 
of poverty leads the main character into prostitution and ruination, a theme already 
present in Stephen Crane’s novel Maggie: A Girl of the Streets (1893), a work generally 
considered to be the cornerstone of American naturalism.  
Another, and actually stronger, indicator of the remarkable difference between the 
Latin American and the Japanese adoption of Comtean positivism can be seen in the 
more general field of national political thought. Here we can observe that while in Latin 
America the political and the literary went hand in hand in regard to the philosophy that 
underlies literary Naturalism, the same did not occur in Japan. 
In the political domain, Positivism defended the establishment of a republican 
dictatorship as the most adequate form of government, an ideological trend that took 
hold in Mexico together with the rise of the naturalist novel. Here the rise of positivistic 
republicanism and the emergence of the naturalist novel appear as two facets of the same 
movement. Positivism was in fact the main ideology supported by Mexican dictator 
Porfírio Díaz (1830–1915), who ruled the country for over thirty years until 1911. Díaz 
favored all forms of scientificism in Mexican society, and established around himself a 
clique of politicians and intellectuals that he called “científicos.” Among them appeared 
the diplomat and novelist Federico Gamboa, the same who authored the aforementioned 
novel Santa. 
A republican dictatorship was the way towards which Brazilian politics was 
developing around the same time. Here the fall of the monarchy in 1889 brought 
something similar to a military dictatorship with the first two presidents being high 
military commanders and fierce defenders of Positivism. On the literary side, Brazil’s 
main naturalist novelist, Aluísio Azevedo, worked also as journalist and published harsh 
critics of the emperor, Peter II, calling for the establishment of a republic. So just as 
in Mexico, the republican ideal of Comtean positivism permeated the political and 
the literary in Brazil. Brazil’s Positivism was so strong that to this day the Brazilian 
republican flag shows the positivist slogan, “order and progress.”
A contrary movement from that of Mexico and Brazil occurred in Japanese politics 
at the time of the rise of Naturalism. While the two Latin American countries maintained 
the authoritarian republican ideal of the positivist credo, Japan was precisely leaving the 
military dictatorship of the Tokugawa Shogunate to proceed towards a constitutional 
monarchy. The direction was precisely the opposite of the one taken by Brazil, specially. 
Although we cannot engage in an exercise in comparative law and here, an analysis of 
these countries’ constitutional arrangements would disclose the enormous differences in 
the general intellectual climate of such importers of European Naturalism. For one thing, 
the Bismarckian nature of the Meiji Constitution went in the opposite direction of the 
Brazilian Constitution of 1891, which was modeled after that of the United States. While 
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the political found a direct parallel in the literary, and while the political engagements 
of Federico Gamboa and Aluísio Azevedo clearly demonstrated an overt adoption of the 
positivist agenda, just the opposite was the case with Shimazaki Tôson, whose approach 
to naturalist aesthetics set the general mode of Japanese obliviousness to Comtean 
Positivism. 
The parallel progression of the political and the literary in Latin America’s 
adoption of Naturalism and Positivism, when seen in comparison with the contrasting 
case of Japan, suggests the latter’s resistance to a foreign philosophy as compromising 
as Positivism. Above all, it suggests Japan’s selective approach to Naturalism, one that, 
I will argue, was carried over from the domain of the novel to that of poetry. Before we 
enter this latter domain, however, it is important to summarize with the remark that by 
looking to the specifics of Japanese Naturalism in its relation to Positivism, the notion of 
Japan’s epistemological turn at the dawn of Meiji, suggested together with a discovery of 
landscape and an establishment of the modern subject, calls for qualification.  
We thus encounter our next question: if Positivism was not fully absorbed together 
with Naturalism, then how could we define the philosophical dimension of Japanese 
Naturalism?
In order to answer this question we must turn again to the field of epistemology and 
to the role of description in expressing truth. We have mentioned that many philosophies 
avowed description as the correct way to access reality, among them mutually disparaging 
one’s such as Phenomenology and Positivism. Now we should observe what Buddhist 
philosophy has to say about description. This will give us an idea of how to better tackle 
the philosophical content of Japanese Naturalism. 
The Buddhist understanding of description can be observed from the analysis of 
valid cognition found in Buddhist logic. Developing around the beginning of the fifth 
century, the school of logic of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti established the correct way of 
approaching reality from sense perception, refining what I call the principle of realism 
existing in Buddhist philosophy. Dignāga (Jp. Jin’na 陳那, c. 480–540) was a disciple of 
the Gandharan monk and philosopher Vasubandhu (Jp. Seshin 世親, c. 4th century CE), 
one of the founders of the Indian Yogācāra school of Buddhist philosophy, also known 
as the “mind only” school. Vasubandhu is also held as the 21st patriarch of Zen. Dignāga 
tried to accommodate his master’s radical skepticism, summarized in the notion of the 
emptiness of all dharma, in a system that asserted the validity of knowledge. Dignāga’s 
claim was that albeit existing primarily in the mind, knowledge held a truthful correlation 
with the exterior world. 
The Sumatran scholar and philosopher Dharmakīrti (Jp. Hosshô 法称, c. 7th 
century) expanded on Dignāga’s work and wrote most of his famous Seven Treatises on 
Valid Cognition in the form of commentaries on the latter’s texts. Together, the logicians 
advanced a new form of deductive reasoning and built a rich and complex sub-system of 
Buddhist philosophy that overshadows much Western work on logic and epistemology. 
Buddhist logic came to be known in the West initially through the works of Russian 
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indologist F. Th. Stcherbatsky (1866–1942), who in his foundational work Buddhist 
Logic (1930) writes:
[The system of Buddhist logic] claims to be the natural and general logic of the human 
understanding (laukika-vidya). However, it claims also to be critical. Entities whose 
existence is not sufficiently warranted by the laws of logic are mercilessly repudiated, and 
in this point Buddhist logic only keeps faithful to the ideas with which Buddhism started. It 
then denied a God, it denied the Soul, it denied Eternity. It admitted nothing but the transient 
flow of evanescent events and their final eternal quiescence in Nirvana. Reality, according to 
Buddhists, is kinectic, not static, but logic, on the other hand, imagines a reality stabilized in 
concepts and names. The ultimate aim of Buddhist logic is to explain the relation between a 
moving reality and the static construction of thought. (STCHERBATSKY 1962: 2)
If we agree that Buddhism comprises one of the main intellectual grounds to the 
Japanese arts and literature, and if, following Stcherbatsky, we recognize Buddhism’s 
fierce philosophical denial of God, of the Soul, and of Eternity, then we must accept 
that Karatani’s abovementioned claim of the emergence of landscape and description 
in the Japanese arts during Meiji as the overcoming of a transcendental realm does not 
hold. This point is very important to our analysis, for in the next section we will see how 
Sakutarô’s denial of Buddhism repeats the same misinterpretation of Karatani’s in regard 
to the existence of a transcendental realm that was overcome by Japanese modernity. 
From the prism of Buddhist logic we can derive the notion of Buddhist realism, 
and with it understand the Buddhist avowal of description as a means to express reality. 
Dharmakīrti was one of the founders of Buddhist atomism, according to which the only 
objects considered to exist are momentary states of consciousness. Such states, however, 
must bear a close relation to what appears in the cognitive field as external reality, and 
thus be capable of leading human beings to the clarity of mind inhering in nirvana. In 
this sense, Dharmakīrti’s attempt to determine the correct correlation between the mind 
and the objects it produces in a succession of momentary states of consciousness holds 
a close and fundamental relation the Buddhist mārga, or path to enlightenment. Such 
relation was emphasized by Helmut Krasser, who showed the close connection between 
Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s science of epistemology and logic, or hetuvidyā (Jp. In’myō 
因明), and the general Buddhist soteriology.6 
The Buddhist soteriological dimension of logic produced an epistemology of 
presence that is reflected in the Japanese classical arts as these advance a definition of 
6. In response to allegations that Buddhist logic is primarily unrelated to the soteriology of Buddhism, 
Helmut Krasser observes that “Dignāga’s stated aim in writing his Pramānasamuccayavrtti is to 
‘establish valid cognition’ (pramāņasiddhi)” and that “it is clear that in the intention of the promoters 
of pramāṇa studies this system [of valid cognition] apparently had a strong connection with Buddhism 
as a religion, i.e., as the teaching if a path towards salvation, and that they never considered themselves 
to be involved in non-Buddhistic activities” (Helmut Krasser: Are Buddhist Pramānavādins non-
Buddhistic?, in Hōrin: Vergleichende Studien zur japanischen kultur, 11/2004, p. 129 and 146).  
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art as experience and as dō (道), or as the Way to truth and enlightenment (a notion that, 
it must be noted, possesses also strong Daoist influence). Looking at Buddhist logic 
and its assailing realism, the harmonious images of sansuiga perceived by Karatani 
as depictions of a transcendental realm now appear as portrayals of ultimate reality 
conceived as the point instant. The clarity of vision presented in the images discloses the 
contents of a purified mind in its strongest cognitive capacity and amount to a profound 
depiction of reality in its utmost bareness. The disposition is essentially realist, and 
essentially Buddhist. 
A look into some of Dharmakīrti’s analytical concepts will provide us with a 
clearer notion of what I mean by the concept of Buddhist realism. Buddhist logic is often 
referred to as Pramāṇa Theory, indicating an analytical approach to the instruments of 
knowledge, or pramāṇa. Since such instruments are listed as perception and cognition, 
Pramāṇa Theory amounts to a philosophy of mind based on logic. Such logic reveals 
the possibility of two forms of valid cognition, one realized through direct perception 
(pratyakṣa) and another resulting from inference (anumāna). It is from Dharmakīrti’s 
analysis of inference that we will perceive the Buddhist avowal of description as a means 
to access reality as such, disclosing thus the notion of Buddhist realism. Regarding 
Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇa Theory, John Dunne writes:
Pramāṇa Theory generally speak of two forms of inference: “inference for oneself” 
(svārthānumāna) and “inference-for-others” (parārthānumāna). The former is simply an 
inferential cognition: one looks at a smoky room, for example, and (with other conditions in 
place) one infers that fire is present. In contrast, an inference-for-others is one that is stated 
verbally so as to induce an inferential cognition in another person. In other words, this latter 
“inference” (which is actually a series of statements and not an inference) is meant to result 
in another person having his own inference-for-oneself in regard to the question at hand. 
(DUNNE 2004: 25) 
The idea of parārthānumāna clearly amounts to the structuring of a narrative. 
This series of statements, as far as they are a means of valid cognition, establish reality 
and truth in a descriptive way not contrary to literary realism. Dunne goes on to explain 
in detail the basic structure of Dharmakīrtian inference:
S is P because E 
A typical example if this type of inference is:
The hill (S) is a locus of fire (P) because of the presence of smoke (E). 
Here, S is the “subject,” called the sādhyadharmin or pakṣa in Sanskrit; P is the “predicate,” 
known as the sādhyadharma; and E is the “evidence,” know as the hetu or liṅga. 
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Here the inference will be ultimately valid as long as it overcomes conceptualization. 
Since a concept implies always some level of error or distortion, Dharmakīrti establishes 
the notion of svabhāvapratibandha, or “necessary relation,” as the basis for a valid 
inference. Such relation must exist between the evidence and the predicate so that the 
former can be inferred from the latter. A necessary relation is thus defined as one of 
pervasion (vyāpti), which in the example above indicates the inextricability of fire 
and smoke. Such inextricability, it should be remarked, is cognized by means of direct 
perception (pratyakṣa), the first pramāṇa, or means of valid cognition (151).
The extent to which such epistemology permeates Japanese art and literature 
has been greatly overlooked in Japanese Studies. Let us look at an example from the 
Kokinwakashū 古今和歌集 (c. 920):
吹くからに
秋の草木の
しをるれば 
むべ山風を
嵐といふらむ
Fuku kara ni 
Aki no kusaki no
Shiorureba 
Mube yamakaze wo 
Arashi to iu ran
Because right after its blow
The autumn grass
Withers completely
The mountain wind
Is called a storm.7 
This poem by Fun’ya no Yasuhide (b. 885) repeats almost directly Dharmakīrti’s 
syllogism: arashi (嵐), or the storm, is the predicate; yamakaze (山風) or the mountain 
wind, is the subject; and aki no kusaki (秋の草木), or the (withered) autumn grass, is the 
7.  All translations from the Japanese are my own unless otherwise noted.
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evidence. The relation between the evidence and the predicate is one of necessity, or one 
of svabhāvapratibandha. Perhaps a more poetic way to render the piece in translation 
would be:
Is it not precisely because right after its blow
The autumn grass
Withers completely
That the mountain wind
Is called a tempest?
This version would probably be more successful in accounting for the sense of 
doubt present in the ending to iu ran (といふらむ), but the basic syllogism that lies at 
the core of the poem would not be altered. What interests us primarily, however, is to 
notice the superb sense of realism present in the text. Piercing though all the suggestive 
overtones that make it a sort of aphorism, the clear cut reality on which the poem is 
based conveys a sense of resoluteness and certainty resonant of the absolute. From its 
basic expression of truth to a fully developed sense of description is more a matter of 
length and form than of content. 
As nothing like a transcendental realm can be derived from Fun’ya no Yasuhide’s 
poem, we might as well define it aesthetically as a basic form of Japanese realism. As 
far as it repeats the basic syllogism of Buddhist logic, we might also call it Buddhist 
realism. This classification certainly gives the lie to the notion that literary realism is 
exclusively a Western category. 
Up to this point we have seen that Dharmakīrti avows two forms of valid 
cognition: direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). We have also seen 
how the latter functions as a prototype to realist description. Now we must make a 
brief return to observe how the first, direct perception, also functions within a realist 
epistemological stance. 
Let us consider the following modern haiku by Fujita Sôshi (1926-2005):
うすらひは
深山へかへる
花の如
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Usurai wa
Miyama e kaeru
Hana no goto
The thin veil of ice
Returns to the mountain recess
Like a bed of flowers
We mentioned above that Buddhist logic considers the ultimately real to 
exist solely in the point instant. We also remarked that, from its relation to Buddhist 
atomism, it avowed that the only objects considered to exist are momentary states of 
consciousness. Now, with the above poem in perspective, we can see how the notion of 
direct perception also provides a ground to literary realism. 
The mental image comprised of the vision of the mountain recess with its veil of 
ice likened to a bed of flowers produces again reality in its stark bareness. One could say 
that the whole poem is the result of two pure perceptions linked by a comparison. The 
simile allows a new element to come into play: the bed flowers. The result is a unity in 
perception. The entire poem can be read as the statement of a mental image that creates 
an experience of sheer presence. Here we might link Fujita Sôshi’s poetic statement 
to Dharmakīrti’s notion of svalakṣaṇa. In regard to this concept, Yoshimizu Chizuko 
writes:
Little needs to be said about the considerable significance of the term svalaksaṇa which 
literally means ‘own characteristic’, and comes down to term for ‘particular’ or ‘individual’. 
Svalakṣaṇa is characterized by Dignāga (6c.) as the object of direct perception (pratyakṣa), 
i.e., the object of a cognition which is free of conceptual construction (kalpanapodha). 
Dharmakīrti added to this epistemological notion a clear ontological ground by identifying 
it with that which has causal efficacy (arthakriyāsãmarthya, arthakriyāśakti. don byed nus 
pa), that is, an ability to produce an effect. (YOSHIMIZU 2004: 118)
In Fujita Sôshi’s haiku we encounter the particularity of an event that is complete 
and self-sufficient, being thus free from conceptual construction in the very sense of 
Dharmakīrti’s svalakṣaṇa. The percept may liken the veil of ice to a bed of flowers, 
but the latter is not any sort of quality added to the former. The mental image is, again, 
clear from conceptualization and essentially realistic, giving us another example of the 
degree to which Japanese realism is committed to expressing the pure presence of the 
directly observed, and not any sort of transcendental reality. The self-sufficiency of the 
real is explained in Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavarttika in the following terms:
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(43) ekasyārthasvabhāvasya pratyakṣyasya sataḥ |
    ko ‘nyo na dṛṣt.o bhāgaḥsyād yaḥ pramāṇaih. Parikṣyate ||8
Satkari Mookerjee and Nagasaki Hojun offer the following translation to 
Dharmakīrti’s karikā (verse):
One objective entity which is directly perceived as it is itself (is perceived in its entirety). 
How can it have any part which is not perceived along with it and as such would admit of 
being examined (and proved) by acts of inference (as separate cognition)? (MOOKERJEE 
and NAGASAKI 1998: 98)
Mookerjee comments that Dharmakīrti’s point in this karikā is that “when 
the subject is known by perception and its whole nature is entirely apprehended by 
it, the scope of application of another pramāṇa is ruled out (for the ascertainment of 
any property connected with it). This simply means that adding predicates to a fully 
apprehended subject is merely a conceptual construction, and as such does not disclose 
the real as it is.” (99) In Fujita Sôshi’s veil of ice and Fun’ya no Yasuhide’s mountain 
wind, the mental picture they amount to is unique, discrete and instantaneous, and as 
such stands on its own independently of further qualification. 
Buddhist logic’s pramāṇas, or means of valid cognition (direct perception 
and inference) conform the epistemological ground of Buddhist realism. With this in 
perspective, we are now in a position to return to the descriptive aspect of Naturalism 
and reappraise the philosophical dimension of Japanese Naturalism.
As we have seen, Japanese Naturalism adopted formal and thematic elements 
present in the European movement but, contrarily to its Latin American counterpart, 
avoided an open reception of Positivism at the philosophical level. To suggest the 
Buddhist dimension of Japanese Naturalism, we should recall that at the dawn of 
the twentieth century, Shimazaki Tôson opened his novel Hakai, probably the major 
achievement of Japanese Naturalism in any artistic form, at the gates of the Buddhist 
temple Renge-ji (蓮花寺), setting up a Buddhist scenario whose significance in the 
narrative process has been greatly overlooked by critics. This same Naturalism, as we 
have noted above from Tomasi and Hôgetsu, exerted profound influence on Sakutarô’s 
establishment of free-style colloquial poetry, and with it of Japanese modern poetry. We 
will now turn to Sakutarô’s text and to the inquiry on the Buddhist realist dimension of 
Japanese kindaishi.
8. Cited from Yūsho Miyasaka ed., Pramāṇavarttika-karikā, in Acta Indologica, Vol. II, Naritasan 
Shinshoji, 1972, p. 120.
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3. Hagiwara Sakutarō, Japanese Modern Poetry, and Buddhist Realism
We are now in the position to operate a comparative reading of the texts of early 
Japanese modern poetry and Buddhist philosophy. We will start by looking at Sakutarō’s 
comprehensive theory of poetry set forth in his Shi no Genri (Principles of Poetry, 
1928). Our main interest in this work resides in two specific points: first, Sakutarô’s 
appraisal of Naturalism; and second, his vision of Buddhism. 
Regarding the first, I will cite Sakutarô’s original text of the preface to the second 
edition of 1938:
私がこの書を書いたのは、日本の文壇に自然主義が横行して、すべての詩美と詩
的精神を殺戮した時代であった。その頃には、詩壇自身や詩人自身でさえが、文
壇の悪レアリズムや凡庸主義に感染して、詩の本質とすべき高邁性や浪漫性を自
己虐殺し、却って詩を卑俗的デモクラシイに散文化することを主張していた。し
たがってこの『詩の原理』は、かかる文壇に対する挑戦であり、併せてまた当時
の詩壇への啓蒙だった。(HAGIWARA 1975: 47)
When I first wrote this book, Naturalism was taking hold of the Japanese literary world, 
and it was a time when poetic beauty and the poetic spirit were being abused and destroyed. 
At that time, even poetry groups, as well as the poets themselves, were being infected 
with the evils of bad realism and the banalizing tendencies that were upheld by the literary 
world at large. So that that which should be poetry’s very essence, namely nobleness and 
romanticism, was being massacred. Even worse, the vulgarization of poetry was being 
openly demanded by the insistence on its prosification. As such, this Principles of Poetry 
meant a challenge to the literary world, as well as source of enlightenment to the poetic 
circles of that time. 
Here we see that Sakutarô held Naturalism in very low esteem. We should notice, 
however, that such opinion was not uncommon in his times. The poet’s identification 
of Naturalism with vulgarity calls to mind once again the Latin American example, 
where in 1878 Brazilian novelist Machado de Assis wrote harsh critique of Portuguese 
writer Eça de Queirós, the alleged founder of Portuguese Naturalism. The text is well 
know in the history of Latin American letters, and the attacks on Naturalist aesthetics, 
although similar in content to Sakutarô’s, are worded in much harsher terms than would 
be conceivable as issuing from the Japanese poet.9 
Be it as it may, it is clear that none of the writers perceived the scope of Naturalism’s 
epistemological stance. Sakutarô’s equation of Naturalism with vulgarity, together 
9. Machado de Assis’s text is entitled “O primo Basílio, de Eça de Queirós” (1878) and appears in Obra 
Completa de Machado de Assis (Rio de Janeiro: Nova Aguilar, vol. III, 1994). The Brazilian writer’s 
almost pathetic revolt against the naturalism of Eça de Queirós is uncalled for in several ways, the most 
prominent of which being that Eça de Queirós is hardly at all a naturalist. Although esteemed as a major 
Portuguese writer, his works are more like naïve imitations of nineteenth century European popular 
romances, rather than serious works of the naturalist school of Zola.  
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with his assertion of its ruling out of romanticism and nobleness, seems to overlook 
the fact that the founder of Japanese Naturalism in the novel, Shimazaki Tôson, was 
also the introducer of romanticism in poetry with his Wakanashû (若菜集, 1897). If 
nothing else, this could have called for a more qualified appraisal of Zola’s aesthetics. 
In any case, it is worth noting that Sakutarô’s evaluation of Naturalism is precisely 
opposite to the one we saw earlier as espoused by Shimamura Hôgetsu. This suggests 
not only the polemic and contradictory nature of Naturalism itself, but also Sakutarô’s 
somewhat strict understanding of the movement, together with the poet’s inattention to 
Naturalism’s role in the structuring of modern poetry and of his own work. 
We may now turn to our second point of interest in Shi no Genri, namely 
Sakutarô’s perception of Buddhism. Moving forward to the fourth chapter of the first 
part of the book, entitled Chûshôkan’nen to Gushôkan’nen (Abstract Notions and 
Concrete Notions), we find Sakutarô’s general critique of intellectual movements, or 
“isms,” which he perceives as implying some form of idealism. Among such tendencies 
the poet includes Buddhism, which he uses as an example:
例えば仏陀の幽玄な哲学は、一切の価値を否定することに於て、逆に価値の最高
のもの（涅槃）を主張している。そして所謂ニヒリズムは、存在のあらゆる権威
を否定しながら、逆にその虚無に権威を感じ、そこに彼自身のイデヤを見てい
る。ダダイズムの如きも「一切の主義を奉じない」と言いながら、その「主義を
奉じない主義」を奉じてる。故に絶対の意味で言えば、世にイデアリズムでない
ところの、どんな主義も有り得ない。一切主義であるすべてのものは、それ自ら
理想的であり、観念的であるのだ。(52)
An example can be seen in Buddhism’s subtle and profound philosophy. In spite of its 
denial of all form of value, it still insists in the ultimate value of nirvana. In the same vein, 
the so-called nihilism, while negating all forms of authority, establishes the dictatorship of 
nothingness itself, which becomes the nihilist’s ideal. Also dadaism, while claiming “not 
to follow any doctrines,” follows the doctrine of “not following any doctrines.” It is thus 
that, in the deepest sense, there cannot exist any form of intellectual movement that is not 
idealist. All “isms” are necessarily conceptual and idealist.  
Sakutarô’s attitude towards Buddhism at this point seems to be somewhat more 
lenient than the one he assumes towards Naturalism. His characterization of Buddhist 
philosophy as yūgen (幽玄), which translates as “subtle and profound,” carries a 
positive connotation, echoing the aesthetic terminology of Zeami (14th century) in its 
masterful establishment of Nô poetics. Sakutarô’s perception of Buddhism as a “ism” 
marred by unrestrained idealism, however, suggests the same sort of misunderstanding 
that took Karatani to identify the existence of a transcendental realm in Japanese culture 
that would have been overcome somewhere in the third decade of Meiji. Although 
in his account of the birth of modernity in Japanese literature Karatani does not 
refer specifically to Buddhism, it seems that both writers assume the existence of a 
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life-denying transcendental realm that, under close scrutiny, must at least hold some 
relation to Buddhism. 
What appears to lie at the heart of Sakutarô’s and Karatani’s assumptions is the 
lack of regard to the Indian dimension of Japanese culture, or, more precisely, to the 
original Indian nature of Buddhism. Buddhist scholar Nakamura Hajime (1912–1999) 
has strongly emphasized the influence of India in the development of Japanese culture. In 
his essay “Hinduism Influence on Japanese Culture,” (1992) Nakamura called attention 
to the fact that the oldest Indian manuscripts, dating to the first half of the 6th century, 
are to be found not in India, but in Japan, suggesting a very early transmission.10 Such 
being the case, the lack of scholarly attention to Indian philosophy as an intertextual 
tool for the analysis of Japanese literary texts calls for reconsideration. Undoubtedly 
such lack closely relates to the call made by Ramirez-Christensen and presented in 
the beginning of this essay. Such lack also underpins Sakutarô’s misconstruction of 
nirvana as an idealist concept that envisages the attainment of a transcendental realm. 
This misconstruction, I contend, lies at the core of the poet’s rejection of Buddhism that 
will be analyzed in detail bellow.   
Before we look into Sakutarô’s call for the effacement of Buddhism from Japanese 
literature, however, we should look into a few of his poems that involve Buddhist 
imagery and scenery. “Shisô wa hitotsu no ishô de aru ka” appears in the fifth section of 
Aoneko (1923), entitled Shisô to Mûmei (Will and Benightedness). The poem poses an 
epistemological question involving the figure of the Buddha:
     思想は一つの意匠であるか
鬱蒼としげつた森林の樹木のかげで
ひとつの思想を歩ませながら
仏は蒼明の自然を感じた
どんな瞑想をもいきいきとさせ
どんな涅槃にも溶け入るやうな
そんな美しい月夜をみた。
「思想は一つの意匠であるか」
仏は月影を踏み行きながら
かれのやさしい心にたづねた。
10. See Nakamura, Hajime. “Hinduism Influence on Japanese Culture,” Japan Times, Tokyo, January 26, 
1992, and also his longer work A History of the Development of Japanese Thought (Tokyo: Kokusai 
Bunka Shinkokai, 2 vols, 1969, reprinted by Routledge, 1999).
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        Shisō wa hitotsu no ishō de aru ka
Ussō to shigetta shinrin no jumoku no kage de
Hitotsu no shisō wo ayumasemagara
Butsu wa sōmei no shizen wo kanjita
Donna meisō wo mo iki iki to sase
Donna nehan ni mo tokehairuyōna
Sonna utsukushii tsukiyo wo mita. 
 “Shisō wa hitotsu no ishō de aru ka”
Butsu wa tsukikage wo fumiyukinagara
Kare no yasashii kokoro ni tazuneta.
    Is a thought the form of a single will?
Wrapped in the arbored dusk of a luxuriant forest
And letting a single thought proceed forward
The Buddha felt the infinite brightness of nature 
And witnessed the splendor of the moonlit evening
That brings life to every single though
That melts into the very nirvana. 
“Is a thought the form of a single will?”
While crossing the moonlight shadow
The Buddha’s gentle heart was visited by a question. 
Approaching this piece from the perspective of the transition from bungo-shi (
文語詩), or the classical form, to kôgo-shi (口語詩), the modern colloquial style, we 
notice in it a significant influence of Naturalism. Although the poem does secure the 
sense of romanticism and loftiness advocated by Sakutarô, it also adopts the narrative 
and descriptive mode of the naturalist aesthetic. The epistemological question posed 
in the seventh verse together with the physical movement of the Buddha crossing the 
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moonlight shadow (tsukikage wo fumiyukinagara 月影を踏み行きながら) produce 
a sense of naturalness in the poem that was mostly absent from the classical style of 
from bungo-shi. In the following verses, also from Aoneko, Sakutarô moves into a 
more critical approach to the figure of the Buddha:
 
     佛陀 或は 世界の謎
赭土の多い丘陵地方の
さびしい洞窟の中に眠つてゐるひとよ
君は貝でもない　骨でもない　物でもない。
さうして磯草の枯れた砂地に
ふるく錆びついた時計のやうでもないではないか。
ああ　君は「眞理」の影か　幽靈か
いくとせもいくとせもそこに坐つてゐる
ふしぎの魚のやうに生きてゐる木乃伊よ。
このたへがたくさびしい荒野の涯で
海はかうかうと空に鳴り
大海嘯の遠く押しよせてくるひびきがきこえる。
君の耳はそれを聴くか？
久遠のひと　仏陀よ！
       Buddha Aruiwa Sekai no Nazo
Akatsuchi no ooi chūryō chihō no
Sabishii dōkutsu no naka ni netteiru hito yo
Kimi wa kai de mo nai    hone de mo nai    mono de mo nai
Sōshite isokusa no kareta sunaji ni
Furuku sabitsuita tokei no yō de mo nai de wa nai ka. 
Aa  kimi wa “shinri” no kage ka yūrei ka
Ikutosemo ikutosemo soko ni suwatte iru
Fushigi no sakana no yō ni ikiteiru miira yo. 
Kono taegataku sabishii arano no hate de
Umi wa kōkõ to sora ni nari
Ootsunami no tooku oshiyosetekuru hibiki ga kikoeru. 
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Kimi no mimi wa sore wo kiku ka?
Kuon no hito Buddha yo!
     Buddha, or the World’s Mystery
In the mountainous region of red soil 
Inside a lonely cave each and every night
You are not a shell, you are not a bone, you are not a thing
And in the sandy soil of dried seashore weeds
Are you also not something like an old rusted watch?
Ah are you the shadow of truth, or perhaps a ghost?
Year after year just sitting there
Living in a mummy like state like a strange fish. 
At the end point of this unbearably desolate wasteland
The sea brightly cries to the open sky
And the distant sounds of onrushing waves are faintly heard.  
Can your ears gather those?
Eternal being, oh Buddha!
Here the Buddha seems to have lost contact with reality. His ears appear to no 
longer gather the sounds of the onrushing waves of the sea that brightly cries to the open 
sky. Sakutarô’s view in this piece draws nearer to his overt rejection of Buddhism. The 
charge against the Buddha is made in regard to his irredeemable transcendence, which 
appears to imply the lost connection with reality. 
A relevant point in Aoneko is Sakutarô’s citation of Schopenhauer in the epigraph 
to the revised edition of 1923. Schopenhauer’s famous catchphrase, “The universe is an 
expression of the will, and the essence of the will is suffering,” is well known as being 
highly influenced by Hinduism and Buddhism. The irony here lies in the fact that in his 
rejection of the Buddha’s transcendence, Sakutarô finds a more tangible philosophy in 
Schopenhauer, who in fact was a champion of Indian philosophy during the nineteenth 
century. 
This sends us to the question of Westernization and the development of Japanese 
modern poetry. In the essay “Shi no Genri kara Mizushima e: Nihon no shi no ongakusei 
ni tsuite” (From Shi no Genri to Mizushima: On the Musicality of Japanese Poetry), Naitô 
Takeshi defends the idea that Japanese modern poetry was largely modeled after Western 
poetry. According to the critic, this situation arose not from a purely formal westernizing 
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disposition, but from a substantial demand at the level content that needed to be answered 
by the employment of new and expanded poetic forms. In Naitô’s own words,
西欧詩を規範にした日本の近代詩は、短歌の三十一音以上の長さを必要としてい
るが、それはより多くの言いたいことを述べ、より複雑な思考を入れたいという
ところから始まっている。(NAITÔ 2005: 54)
While it was modeled after Western poetry, Japanese modern poetry needed an enlarged form 
that went beyond the 31 syllables of tanka. And that began because it had more things to say, 
it needed to include more complex ideas in the poem. 
The critic goes on to explain that such demand from content, that is, the necessity of 
including more complex ideas in the poem, resulted directly in Sakutarô’s achievement of 
the free-colloquial style in Tsuki no hoeru (1917). Although Naitô’s appraisal is not entirely 
wrong, we still need to ask about the content of those ideas that were posing demands of 
textual enlargement on early modern poets such as Sakutarô. More specifically, we must 
ask what those “more complex ideas” would be. In order to answer this question, we need 
to consider not only Sakutarô’s philosophical influences, but, most of all, the extent to 
which such influences were truly Western. 
Sakutarô’s Western philosophical influences suggest a lingering relation to 
Buddhism. The poet’s well-known Western philosophical influences comprise primarily 
three thinkers: Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Kant. The first we already know as being 
strongly influenced by Indian philosophy. The second is also valued by Sakutarô for 
reasons that are actually found in the Buddhist textual tradition, namely his understanding 
of human suffering (which repeats that of Schopenhauer) and his poetic sense, which, 
according to Sakutarô, is capable of condensing truth in the form of aphorisms.11 The 
poetic and aphoristic sense, we should note, is also not at all foreign to the Buddhism, 
as becomes clear when we consider Buddhist sūtra and abhidharma texts. 
The third of Sakutarô’s acknowledged Western philosophical influences holds 
an even stronger relation to Buddhist philosophy. The influence of Kant on Sakutarô 
has been analyzed by Kurihara Hiuma in “Sakutarô Kenkyû • Shisaku no Kiseki – 
Mihappyô Genkô wo Shiza to Shite” (Sakutarô Studies, Tracing Speculative Thought: 
The Standpoint of the Unpublished Manuscripts). In his analysis of the unpublished 
manuscripts that appear in the fifteenth volume of Sakutarô’s collected works, 
Chikuma Shobô edition, Kurihara suggests that Sakutarô had in depth knowledge of 
Kant’s philosophy. According to the critic, the poet’s synopsis of the first critique’s 
Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Logic found among his unpublished 
11. Under Nietzsche’s influence, Sakutarô would write his own volume of aphorisms. An appraisal of Sakutarô’s 
understanding of Nietzsche can be gathered directly from the poet’s essay “Miscelaneous Impressions on 
Nietzsche”, which appears in the 9th volume of Hagiwara Sakutarō Zenshū, Chikuma Shobō Edition, 1976. 
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texts show a sort of clarity and conciseness capable of overshadowing Kant himself 
(KURIHARA 2005: 106). It is from the German philosopher’s understanding of the role 
of the senses in constructing reality (as the basis for the a priori forms of the sensibility) 
that Sakutarō develops an epistemology of art based on the concept of kansei (感性, 
sensibility). As Sakutarô himself explains in the foreword to his Shi no Genri (1928), 
his work assimilates an early theoretical attempt entitled Geijutsuteki Ninshikiron (An 
Epistemology of Art), which proposed an the analytical rendering of the aesthetic reason, 
or biteki risei. Sakutarô justifies his intention by means of a critique of Kant, suggesting 
that the freedom allowed by the philosopher to practical reason, that is, to the moral 
realm, should equally be extended to the aesthetic reason, or to the artistic realm.
Our interest here lies in the poet’s intense dialog with the Kantian text, and in 
the strong likeness in content between Kant’s and the Buddhist text. Such likeness has 
been comprehensively analyzed in my work in French entitled Kant et Nāgārjuna: 
vers la fin de la philosophie comme herméneutique (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2008). As 
the analysis of this work’s argument transcends the scope of this article, it suffices 
to say that both texts present a skeptical epistemology, from which follows a similar 
conclusion regarding the possibilities of a moral world. In any case, clarifying the 
coincidences between the two texts requires a terminological investigation that 
involves the notions of ontology and metaphysics. In the Kantian text, these notions 
gravitate around the concept of transcendence, and the failure to grasp them correctly 
has generated a series of misreadings that plague the field of literary studies. Kant 
uses the term transcendental to signify an epistemological stance that is incapable 
of knowing the thing-itself, but that at the same time provides for knowledge of the 
phenomenal world. Consequently, Kant’s transcendental, as in transcendental logic 
and transcendental aesthetic, does not signify any transcendental realm separated 
from lived experience. Kant’s philosophy is transcendental only in its own terms, 
and not in the one used, for example, by Karatani as cited above. In this latter 
sense, both the Kantian and the Buddhist Mahāyāna texts are metaphysical, but not 
transcendental. Buddhist philosophy is metaphysical in the same sense as Kant’s, for 
it recognizes reality as existing not in the physical objects, but in the mind. It is thus 
meta-physical. It is also transcendental in the Kantian sense of pointing to reality as 
separated from exteriorly existing matter, or from what Kant termed the thing-itself, 
but it is realist in avowing that this separation does not mean total independence. It is 
finally not transcendental in the religious sense, for it does not posit the existence of 
a transcendental realm of the general religious sort, the term religion being a Western 
concept derived from the Latin religare and applied mostly at risk to some forms of 
Buddhist practice. It is thus that both for Kant and for Buddhist philosophy all ontology 
is primarily false, for all knowledge is metaphysical. Finally, while Kant’s kingdom of 
ends is actual lived reality perfect by reason, the realization of Buddha nature in the 
world is also the perfecting of reality made possible by the correct understanding of it, 
together with corresponding practice (prajñaparāmitā). It is in this overall sense that 
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Sakutarô’s turn to Kant in his cognitive theory of art can be surmised as equivalent to 
a turn to the Buddhist Sanskrit tradition.
The similarity between the Kantian and the Buddhist texts, added to Sakutarô’s 
aforementioned interest in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, shows that what the poet 
sought in Western philosophy might as well have been looked for in the textual 
tradition of Buddhism. Or yet, it is possible to conjecture that Sakutarô’s turn to the 
Western philosophers he discussed and praised, was from the start carried out from 
the perspective of a Buddhist mind. Be it as it may, my point here is that by going 
inward to the Indian roots of Japanese philosophy and art, Sakutarô would probably 
have come closer to the philosophical answers he was seeking in regard to notions of 
perception and aesthetics.
Continuing our analysis of the Buddhist dimension of Sakutarô’s poetry, we can 
now turn to one of his most representative works. Looking at Jimen no soko no byônin no 
kao (Face of an ailing man in the bottom of the earth) under the light of the dvādaśāṇga-
pratītyasamutpāda  (The twelve-link chain of co-dependent origination, Jp. 十二支縁
起 - 因果論) will show us how this piece represents a highly accomplished example 
of what I have been calling Buddhist realism:
地面のそこの病人の顔
地面のそこに顔があらわれ、
さみしい病人の顔があらわれ。
地面のそこのくらやみに、
うらうら草の茎が萌えそめ、
鼠の巣が萌えそめ、
巣にこんがらかつてゐる、
かずしれぬ髪の毛がふるえ出し、
冬至のころの、
さびしい病人の地面から、
ほそい青竹の根が生えそめ、
それがじつにあわれふかくみえ、
けぶるごとくに視え、
じつに、じつに、あわれふかげに視え。
地面のそこのくらやみに、
さみしい病人の顔があらわれ。
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Jimen no soko no byōnin no kao
Jimen no soko ni kao ga araware
Samishii byōnin no kao ga araware.
Jimen no soko no kurayami ni,
Ura ura kusa no kuki ga haesome,
Nezumi no sū ga haesome,
Sū ni kongarakatteiru,
Kazushirenu kami no ke furuedashi,
Tōji no koro no,
Samishii byōnin no jimen kara,
Hosoi aodake no ne ga haesome,
Sore ga jitsu ni aware fukaku mie,
Keburu gotoku ni mie,
Jitsu ni, jitsu ni, aware fukage ni mie,
Jimen no soko no kurayami ni,
Samishī biōnin no kao ga araware.
Face of an ailing man in the bottom of the earth
In the bottom of the earth appears a face,
The face of a lonely ailing man. 
In the darkness of the bottom of the earth,
Sprout brightly the shoots of grass,
And sprouts a rat’s nest,
Entangled in the nest,
Shiver countless threads of hair,
In the winter solstice,
From the bottom of an ailing man’s face,
Sprouts the root of a thin young herb,
And that looks indescribably gloomy,
Like some sort of smoke,
Truly, truly, looking deeply sorrowful. 
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In the darkness of bottom of the earth, 
Appears the face of a lonely ailing man
 
Featured in the collection Tsuki ni hoeru (Howling to the Moon, 1917), Jimen no 
soko no byônin no kao is as an avant-garde piece that transcends generic classification. 
While Romanticism and the aesthetics of idealism are ruled out from these verses, they 
do present elements of Naturalism and Surrealism in the lingering images of death and 
of the rat’s nest entangled with human hair, all existing together in the low darkness 
of the earth. Elements of description, direct perception, and valid cognition operate to 
establish a picture of despair, or a metaphor for life in general, where solitude and decay 
turn back and forth into life, as it sprouts again in the form of young stalks of greenery. 
Appearing in a sequence of interconnected frames, the linked visual elements of such 
metamorphosis suggest cinematic techniques of camera fading and dissolve typical of 
early surrealist film (the superposed images remind us of scenes from Luís Buñuel and 
Teshigahara Hiroshi, or from the earlier avant-garde works of Man Ray).  
The gist of the poem lies in the fact that, as they mingle in the basic darkness of the 
earth, the ailing visage, the rat’s nest, and the shivering threads of human hair all become 
one single reality. This unity suggested in the poem ensues from the all-encompassing 
perception of a mind that is capable of seeing unity in diversity, or that has transcended 
discrimination. This mind is capable of understanding the causal relationship between 
the links that form an existential state of unsurmountable despair: life, sickness and 
death are all product of the same darkness, and their inter-relation amounts to what 
Dharmakīrti called vyāpti, or pervasion. At the aesthetic and thematic levels, the poem 
mingles Naturalism and Buddhism with a strong avant-garde disposition, producing a 
clear example of Buddhist realism: the cycle formed by the crude images in sequence 
repeats the Buddhist analysis of causation that generates the cycle of saṃsāra. The 
twelve links of this cycle, or the so-called twelve nidānas (Jp. in’nen 因縁) are as 
follows:
1) avidyā (Jp. Mumyô 無明 ignorance or delusion) 
2) samskāra (Jp. gyô 行 mental formations or conceptions) 
3) vijñāna (Jp. shiki 識 consciousness) 
4) nāmarūpa (Jp. myôshiki 名色 name and form) 
5) sadāyatana (Jp. rokusho 六處 the six senses and their organs) 
6) sparśa (Jp. soku 觸 contact) 
7) vedanā (Jp. ju 受 sensation) 
8) tṛṣṇā (Jp. katsuai 渇愛 desire) 
9) upādāna (Jp. shu 取 attachment) 
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10) bhava (Jp. u 有 being or existence)
11) jāti (Jp. shō 生 birth) 
12) jarāmarana (Jp. rôshi 老死 old age and death)12 
Altogether, these links form the cycle of life and death that is defined as saṃsāra. 
The circularity of Jimen no soko no byōnin no kao, where the first verse is repeated in 
the end (with a slight modification), thus establishing a sense of eternal return, provides 
the same idea of endless causation and of endless suffering. Going from birth (in the 
green stalks) to old age and death (in the ailing face and the shivering hair), Jimen no 
soko no byōnin no kao can be read as a metaphor for the cycle of saṃsāra.  
Given the strong Buddhist philosophical underpinning of this representative 
work, we must inquire on the extent and meaning of Sakutarô’s call for the rejection 
of Buddhism that appeared in the journal Chūgai Nippō (中外日報) on September 
28, 1934. Sakutarô’s article, entitled “Bukkyō to Gendai Bungei” (Buddhism and the 
Contemporary Literary Arts) has been analyzed by Suga Kunio in Hagiwara Sakutarô 
• Futatsu no Ronsô ni Miru Bukkyô no Imi (Hagiwara Sakutarō: The Meaning of 
Buddhism Seen in Two Controversies),13 where the critic examines a heated discussion 
on the theme of Buddhism between Sakutarô and Buddhist scholar Yamabe Shûgaku 
(1882-1944). Sakutarô’s text in Chūgai Nippō reads as follows:
明治以来の新しい日本文学は、すべて皆日本人的な文学であり、あまりに諦観、
虚淡的、風流的、仏教的な文学ばかりであた。(中略) ゾラや、ツルげネフや、
モーパッサンや、ボードレールや、ドストエフスキィを手本として、彼等のやう
に書く [ためには] 彼等西洋の作家と同じやうに、強い人間的熱意によつて人生
を感じたり、考えたり [しなければならず]、日本人の東洋的、仏教的な思潮を
排してキリスト教やヘレニズムに本質してゐる西洋思潮を学び、生活の実感上に
洗礼を受けねばならない。
Since its establishment in the Meiji period, the new Japanese literature has been too 
traditionally Japanese, and as such excessively resigned, pale, elegant and Buddhistic. (...) 
In order to write like Zola, Turgenev, Maupassant, Baudelaire and Dostoyevsky, Japanese 
writers must, like the Europeans, feel and think about life with passion. They must reject 
their Eastern and Buddhistic intellectual trends, and adopt in their place the Christian and 
Hellenistic dispositions that constitute the essence of Western thought, receiving thus a sort 
of baptism of real human feelings.    
12. The concept of the twelve nidānas appears already in the earliest texts of the Pāli Canon, notably in the 
Brahmajāla Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya (Long Discourses). See Maurice Walshe, The Long Discourses 
of the Buddha: a Translation of the Dīgha Nikāya (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1995).
13. Suga’s article appears in the periodical Shi to Shisō (Poetry and Thought), 2 (113): 41-46.
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Published in 1934, almost two decades after the 1917 appearance of Tsuki ni 
Hoeru, Sakutarô’s words show a remarkable turn against Buddhism. The poet recognized 
the depth of Buddhism’s influence in Japanese culture, and also the unconscious 
presence of it in the Japanese intellectual make-up, but disavowed its revival: “Today’s 
re-examination of Buddhism, or of the very Buddhist worldview that has from old 
penetrated the Japanese sensibility and that is known instinctively and unconsciously 
to all of us, while its essence is clearly being forgotten at the conscious level, its re-
examination has become unfruitful in terms of re-establishing Buddhism as a conscious 
faith” (SUGA 1994: 43). 
Suga points to the times being those of the rise of militarism, poverty and social 
problems in Japan, with the concurrent and rapid rise of new religions. Although 
Buddhism is generally understood as distinct from these, the poet’s anti-religious 
sentiment was broad enough to encompass the originally Indian tradition that he himself 
recognized as being deep-rooted in the Japanese sensibility. In spite of the usages of 
Buddhism in the rise of Japanese nationalism during the 1930s, which must have 
played a role in Sakutarô’s outright disavowal of it, the poet’s main charge has to do 
his identification of Buddhism with resignation and, at the literary level, with the cause 
of a pale or dispassionate quality in the artwork. Even acknowledging it as an essential 
constituent of Japanese culture, the poet asserts that in order to create a new literature in 
Japan, “as literary artists we must do away with Buddhism” (44) 
Sakutarô’s perception of Buddhism as a life-denying ideology can be surmised 
from his theoretical essay on haiku entitled Kyôshû no shijin: Yosa Buson (Yosa Buson, 
the Poet of Nostalgia, 1933). Here Sakutarô expounds his preference for the poetry of 
Yosa Buson (1716–1784) instead of that of Matsuo Bashô (1644–1694) on the basis 
of the youthful vigor of the former in contrast to the weary view of life of the latter. 
Sakutarô praises Buson by insisting on his modernity, and by constantly comparing the 
poet from Settsu with the late-nineteenth century Western symbolists. Bashô, on the 
contrary, is interpreted as frail and as possessing a view of life that hinders the expression 
of that same passion that was praised in Zola, Turgenev, Maupassant, Baudelaire and 
Dostoyevsky.   
 Given that Bashô’s poetry is strongly influenced by Buddhism, and that Sakutarô’s 
view of Buson’s denies him any Buddhist influence, it would not be mistaken to perceive 
the grudge against Buddhism as underlying Sakutarô’s side-taking between Buson and 
Bashô. In any case, how much the life-denying and old-weary view of life claimed by 
Sakutarô to exist in Bashô’s poetry entails the idea of a Buddhist transcendental realm 
to be sought in an after-life is something we must consider. Sakutarô’s critique of Bashô, 
read together with his critique of Buddhism, suggests the possibility of understanding 
the latter as the core of that very transcendence that ws mentioned by Karatani as having 
been overcome by the new modernity of Meiji. Undoubtedly Sakutarô’s view of Japanese 
modernity is remarkably akin to that of Karatani’s. Sakutarô regards Buddhism as too 
transcendent, while Karatani perceives a wall of transcendence that was surpassed 
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during the third decade of Meiji, right at the event of the birth of Japanese literary 
modernity. Sakutarô, in the same vein, asserts that Buddhism gets in the way of literary 
modernity. Both writers perceive modernity in primarily Western terms, denying the 
possibility of a Japanese modernization that is not modeled after the West.   
In spite of the grudge against a Buddhism construed as an imposer of transcendence, 
looking back at Sakutarô’s Jimen no soko no byōnin no kao, with its dark and sorrowful 
depiction of life and death, we can surmise the unconscious influence of a Buddhist 
epistemology at play in the poet’s grasp of reality. The claim seems to be validated 
by the poet himself, for has it not been the very Sakutarô who, in “Bukkyō to Gendai 
Bungei” asserted that the Buddhist worldview “has from old penetrated the Japanese 
sensibility and is known instinctively and unconsciously to all of us”? 
Conclusion
The stated aim of this essay was to provide a contribution to the analysis of the 
Buddhist dimension of Japanese poetry, attempting to answer at least in part the demand 
posed by Ramirez-Christensen in Emptiness and Temporality. In order to that, I started 
with a discussion of the idea of transcendence posed by Karatani Kôjin in Origins of 
Modern Japanese Literature, proceeded by looking into the role of Naturalism and its 
philosophical implications in the establishment of Japanese modern poetry, considered 
the descriptive aspect of the European movement’s compatibility with Buddhist 
epistemology, pointed to the idea of a Buddhist realism derived from the logic of 
Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, and finally brought the concept of Buddhist realism to bear 
on the works of Hagiwara Sakutarô. I closed my analysis by pointing to the similar 
epistemological stance assumed by Sakutarô and Karatani in regard to modernity and 
to the theme of overcoming transcendence, suggesting that a particular understanding 
of Buddhism underlies the work both writers. My hope is that the above has dutifully 
served the originally stated purpose of this essay.  
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